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Page 2 of a letter (or memorandum) analysing US-Brazil relations. The author recounts conversations with American officials, bankers, and diplomats about Brazilian expectations following Kennedy's election, warns against false hopes of a new Marshall Plan, argues that Brazil needs practical aid (wheat, oil, coal) rather than monetary assistance, and traces the deterioration of relations to post-Roosevelt inattention, citing episodes involving Secretaries Acheson and Eisenhower's treatment of President Kubitschek.
the Brazilians are strongly led. They have brought their economic [ilegível] ment to the point where, as a leading Brazilian economist put it to [ilegível] "we have started down the runway but we have not yet gotten up enough speed to achieve the take-off."
On the question of our relations with Brazil I talked with many [ilegível] members of Congress, high Administration officials, reporters, editors and publishers, business men, bankers and diplomats. At first I was much troubled. For it seemed to me that in their rejoicing, which was general, over Kennedy's election they were building up false hopes and expecting too much. The fear haunted me that they had not understood the consequences of the changed international position of the United States, and that they were hoping we could do in South America what we had done in Europe in the days of the Marshall Plan and the dollar gap.
But I came to see that this was a superficial first impression. Although I did not have a chance to talk with the President-elect, who was in London, I did see men close to him who had worked with him and knew him well. The truth, I venture to think, is that the Brazilian government is quite well aware of the situation of the dollar, and of the political consequences in the relative power and position of Europe and North America. I believe that they are adjusting themselves to this new international situation, and that the problem of Brazilian-American relations is wrapped up within this adaptation. That is to say, what they will expect of us is help in achieving the take-off but the help they will expect will not involve deeply the international monetary exchanges.
To plan and organize this kind of help will require ingenuity and resourcefulness, qualities that have been notably lacking in recent years, and they may require minor changes in our laws. In one way or another we shall have to give aid by sending wheat and oil and coal, of which we have a surplus and they have a deficit, and we shall have to assist them in funding their external debts.
Gradually, I began to see what has gone wrong in our relations with Brazil. Inattention and mediocrity and lack of understanding are the causes of the trouble. The rulers and leaders of Brazil feel that since the death of Franklin Roosevelt there has been nobody for them to talk to who had power and who cared about them. Since his death they have had no access to the key people in this country and they have not had contact with the best minds devoted to political and financial international affairs. The deterioration began under President Truman, and the story is generally believed that Secretary Acheson told a leading Latin American diplomat that he was not interested in South America, and that the Latin Americans could talk to one of his subordinates.
Whether the story is true or false, what it signifies is the hub of the matter. It is generally believed in Brazil that when President Kubitschek visited Washington, President Eisenhower went through the ceremonies for him but told him to talk about business to subordinate officials.
Secretaria de Estado das Relaçoes Exteriores
Acheson
the story is generally believed that Secretary Acheson told a leading Latin American diplomat that he was not interested in South America, and that the Latin Americans could talk to one of his subordinates.